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Abstract 
Longitudinal data from interviews with Poles of working age conducted in 1988, 1993 and 
1998 present a detailed view of the transition from a state dominated to a market economy.  Job 
loss in state firms and job creation in new private firms are the dominant employment change, 
other than retirements from the labor force.  In the Polish case, a significant proportion of this 
movement over the 1988 to 1998 period involves a period of unemployment or exit from the 
labor force before obtaining a private sector job.  A second feature of the Polish transition is 
considerable job competition between workers leaving the state sector and those who were out of 
the labor force at the beginning of the transition.  The likelihood of moving to the private sector 
was higher for the better educated and for residents of regions with a robust de novo economy, 
suggesting that the supply of jobs in the private sector combined with higher levels of human 
capital lead to faster and smoother transitions.  Lastly, wage differences between the state sector 
and the de novo sector appear to have little association with mobility, suggesting that movement 
is not strongly related to the opportunity to find a higher paying job.   
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Interest in job creation and job destruction (JCJD) as a way to describe the transformation of 
economies has spawned a number of important theoretical and empirical studies of these 
processes.  On the theoretical aspects, see Aghion and Blanchard (1994), Castanheira and Roland 
(2000), Roland (1992 and 2000).  The main feature of these models is that the imposition of 
competition and the hardening of budget constraints on the state owned firms lead to the closing 
of jobs in that sector – the job destruction process.  The de novo private sector, composed of firms 
that have been privatized or newly created, is the source of job creation to employ those laid off 
from or voluntarily leaving the state sector.  The rates of destruction and creation, which are 
empirical characteristics that vary from country to country, then determine the speed and 
ultimately the success of the transition.   
The empirical work describing the JCJD process and testing some of the theoretical 
propositions follows two different tracks, which taken together offer important insights into the 
transitional process.  One set of studies is based on longitudinal data on employment (and other 
factors such as payroll) among a set of firms. (See Brown, et. al., 1990 for Michigan; Jackson, 
Klich, and Poznańska, 1999, 2002 for Poland; and Faggio and Konings, 1999, for comparisons 
across Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania.)  These studies provide important 
insights into the magnitude, speed, and source of the destruction and creation.  For a given time 
period, job creation is the jobs added by growing firms plus the employment in new firms started 
during that period.  Job destruction is the sum of jobs lost in declining firms, including those that 
exited during the period.  In theory this methodology has the advantage of covering large sections 
of the economy, depending upon the data source, and being based on actual job counts by firm.  
They are limited, however, because of systematic under-reporting in most countries and the total 
absence of enterprise data in others.
1   
Other empirical studies are based on data from household employment surveys that ask 
respondents about current and past jobs and past spells of unemployment.  (See Jurajda and 
Terrell, 2001.)   The responses to these recall questions are used to construct the person’s 
employment history for the time period in question.  These reconstructions are then used to make 
estimates of the aggregate rates of job destruction and creation and the rate of transition from one 
employment category to another.  There are obvious uncertainties introduced by using people’s 
recall of their employment experiences.
2  There are other limitations in these data, beyond the 
recall uncertainties, with respect to assessing employment change over the course of the 
transitions in East-Central Europe.  A major restriction is that even with the recall questions, 
some employment histories do not cover employment prior to the transition, thus making 
inferences about the total amount and type of job destruction and creation problematic.  (The 
                                                      
1 Non reporting can be of two types.  One is explicit in that the agency responsible for the 
statistical data exempts certain types of firms.  In Poland, for example, all firms with five or fewer 
employees are not required to file employment data with the central statistical office.  In the 
Czech Republic that threshold is even higher.  The second type of non-reporting is informal in 
that firms that should report don’t.  The magnitude of this informal economy varies from country 
to country and over time but cannot be ignored, at least in the early years of the transition.  
Institutional reforms along with external pressure, such as that exerted on countries applying for 
EU membership, seem to be reducing this aspect of non-reporting in the more advanced 
countries.   
2 Jurajda and Terrell (2001, p. 10) contend that recalls should be accurate due to the centrality of 
employment experiences in one’s life and the relatively few transitions that each respondent 
experienced.  The Polish data, however, indicate that our respondents had more transitions than 
the Czech respondents, making reliance on recall a bit more problematic. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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Czech data cover the period 1991 to 1996 while the Estonian data were collected in 1995 and ask 
about employment in 1989, thus providing a better span for the transition.)  The use of recall data 
become even more problematic if one wants to examine propositions about what individual or 
local characteristics are associated with workers’ movements from one type of job to another.  
This analysis requires more detailed data on respondents’ pre-transition circumstances, such as 
wage rates, type of job, education, etc. than is likely available through the recall questions in 
current surveys.  What is required is longitudinal data that includes information about 
respondents’ employment and characteristics prior to the transition.   
The data analyzed in this paper overcomes some of the limitations with cross-sectional labor 
market surveys.  The Polish Academy of Sciences began a longitudinal study of workers and 
occupations in 1988.  Selected respondents were re-interviewed in 1993 and again in 1998, with 
supplemental samples added in each wave to keep the sample current and to provide an over 
sample of entrepreneurs and college graduates.  (The data are described in Appendix A.)  Each 
wave contains extensive data on respondents -- such as employment, by industry and ownership 
type, wages, and occupation; individual characteristics, education, age, gender, etc.; and a broad 
set of work attitudes, what they value in a job, willingness to take financial risks, etc.  These data 
can be used to make a number of important descriptive analyses about the JCJD process and job 
mobility during the Polish transition.  The information on individual job changes can be used to 
test various propositions about what individual and regional characteristics are associated with 
success in making the transition. 
The first section of the paper is largely descriptive, showing the transition rates from one type 
of employment to other employment for each wave of the panel.  These descriptions are presented 
in the form of a Markov transition model, so the entries can be interpreted as the probability that a 
person employed in one type of enterprise at t0 (1988 or 1993) is employed in that same 
enterprise or a different type at t1 (1993 or 1998).  These transition probabilities provide very 
important evidence about job destruction and creation in each wave of the Polish transition.
3   
These tables, and the associated analysis, provide insights into the transitions that took place in 
Poland, a country widely seen as having a relatively successful transition following quite 
draconian and rapid transition policies.  The individual data also will help confirm or question the 
conclusions reached with firm data on the transition.  (Jackson, Klich and Poznańska; 1999, 
2002).  Poland is one of the few cases where we have both firm data and individual data from 
which to estimate job creation and destruction rates.
4 
The second part of the paper then tests statistically several propositions about variations in 
these transition rates and in wage rates.  One important comparison is between wage rates in the t1 
and the t0 jobs, a “pull” factor, and the closing of a job in the old sector, a “push” factor in leading 
workers to shift jobs.  The analysis of job mobility also includes different measures of human 
                                                      
3 The two waves coincide nicely with changes in the Polish transition.  1993 is the end of the 
period when the government was controlled by the post-Solidarity liberal reformers and the 
beginning of the period of governing by the post-Communist coalition elected in the Fall, 1993.  
This coalition was voted out of office and replaced by a right-wing coalition in the Fall, 1997.  
The coincidence of governmental changes and survey waves provides an excellent way to 
examine the impacts of different governments and policies on job transitions.   
4 The Polish data are not appropriate to address the question of the optimality of the speed of 
transition.  The sample size is too small and the information about the timing of the employment 
changes is too limited to compare the temporal rates of destruction and creation.  If the individual 
and firm level data are consistent, the firm level data provide the necessary information to discuss 
the speed of transition.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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capital, such as education, work experience, age, and occupation.  Additional factors examined 
are the amount of job creation, destruction, and unemployment in the local labor market.  This 
part of the analysis permits testing of hypotheses about how local economic contexts and 
circumstances contribute to the transition process.   
Employment Transitions 
Our discussion of the Polish economic transition begins with a table showing the probability 
that a person employed in a given category in 1988 is employed in that or a different category in 
1993 or 1998.  For our discussion of job creation and destruction during the transition to a market 
economy, the important categories are state owned enterprises, private firms, and not employed. 
State firms are disaggregated by manufacturing and mining and all other, including trade, 
services, and administrative.  There is no category for “unemployed” in 1988, hence its omission 
for that year.  In 1993 this category is defined as those without work but who are seeking work.  
The not working category includes those who have never worked plus those who might be 
temporarily without a job for health or other reasons plus retirees.   
It is important from the standpoint of examining transitions that 1993 is when unemployment 
peaked during the early part of the transition, reaching a national level of about 16.5%.
5  
Consequently, the transition probabilities for 1988 - 1993 describe the period with the most 
severe short term imbalance between job creation and job destruction.  By contrast, 1998 had the 
lowest unemployment rates since the beginning of the transition.  The 1993 to 1998 years offer a 
picture of job creation and destruction during a period of substantial recovery.  The entire 1988 to 
1998 period should provide a good picture of a transition, with a period of net job creation 
following a period of net job destruction.    
Net and Gross Employment Changes by Category 
Table 1 shows the shifts among types of employment categories, including not working and 
unemployment between 1988 and 1993.  The proportion of individuals who stayed in the same 
category is shown in bold face type to indicate the degree of job stability.  The table also includes 
columns for the total number of cases and for the proportions in each category in each year.  The 
row titled Net Diff is the net gain or loss in a category.  The rows under the category gross job 
creation and destruction are the gross flows into and out of each category.   
     (Table  1  About  Here.) 
The marginals and the net differences indicate important shifts among sectors, with private 
employment, unemployment, and the not working increasing substantially.  The growth in the 
private sector is quite dramatic, particularly as a proportion of its size in 1988.  Gross job creation 
in that sector equaled 180% of its size in 1988.  The proportion in the private sector increased 
from 6.7% to 21.4% as a proportion of the active workforce (meaning the not working are 
excluded).  Virtually all of the additional private sector jobs are in de novo rather than privatized 
firms.
6  The increase in the not working group is due to natural legal retirements plus the 
                                                      
5  The unemployment rate in our sample is lower than the national rate because of the over 
sampling of respondents in 1988 who were self-employed and college educated.  Both these 
groups are less likely to experience periods of unemployment and if they are unemployed are 
likely to be so for a shorter period of time.  Appropriate re-weighting of the sample could correct 
this bias, but our interest at this point is not in estimating national rates, but rather the transition 
among our sample.   
6 Privatizations are defined as respondents employed in the state sector in 1988, or 1993, and the 
private sector in 1993, or 1998, and who say they are working for the same firm as in 1988, or William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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possibility that some 1988 workers who lost their job chose retirement rather than formal 
unemployment.  Unemployment in 1993 is 12.2% of the active workforce in the sample, the 
category with the third largest gross increase.  By far the largest job loss between 1988 and 1993 
in both net and gross terms is in the state owned sector, and the state manufacturing sector in 
particular.  Half the total number of jobs in this sector in 1988 were closed by 1993 (692 jobs out 
of 1372).   
Table 2 shows the same information for the 1993 to 1998 period.  Most of the trends 
observed in the 1988 to 1993 continued, with two notable exceptions.   The number unemployed 
dropped from 12.2% to 9.0% of the active workforce.  This decrease is the result of the transition 
reaching its later stages.  Job destruction in the state sector continued but at a slower rate than in 
1988-1993, while the rate of job creation in the de novo sector, as a proportion of the active 
workforce, increased.  By 1998 the private sector employed a sixth of all respondents and thirty 
percent of the active workforce.  Between 1993 and 1998 this sector accounted for half of all 
gross job creation.  More significantly, it is not the privatization of former state firms but the 
creation of de novo firms that accounts for the growth of the private sector.  By 1998, new private 
firms accounted for nearly eighty percent of all private sector jobs.  This pattern of slowing job 
destruction in the state sector and increasing job creation in the private sector follows the 
conventional pattern of transition, with job creation lagging job destruction.  The overwhelming 
role of de novo firms in creating jobs is consistent with the results using firm level data for 
Poland (Jackson, Klich, and Poznańska; 1991, 2002) and with Jurajda and Terrell’s findings for 
the Czech Republic and Estonia using employment surveys (Jurajda and Terrell, 2001).  The 
other significant change is the decline in the number of private farmers, from 13.2% to 8.3% of 
the respondents and from about 17% to 14% of the active workforce.    
     (Table  2  About  Here.) 
The 1988 to 1998 changes, shown in Table 3, summarize the changes observed for the ten 
year transition period.  The entries in this table, however, make the declines in the state sector and 
the growth of the private sector even clearer.  In 1998 the state sector is forty percent of its 1988 
size while the private sector over four times as large as it was in 1988.  The not working category 
has doubled, which is largely due to normal retirements, as we will see with the analysis of the 
job transitions.  (These ratios are as percentages of the active workforce to standardize for the 
changes in sample sizes and the not working category.)   
     (Table  3  About  Here.) 
In toto, these data indicate a high level of employment turnover in the Polish economy during 
the transition.  Between 1988 and 1993, we estimate the de novo sector job creation was about 
13% and job destruction in the state sector was about 40% of the active 1993 workforce.  For 
1988 to 1998 these proportions are 23% and 70% of the 1998 workforce, respectively.  By 
comparison, estimates of job creation and destruction for the Czech Republic are about 41% and 
30% and for Estonia are about 44% and 40% respectively (Jurajda and Terrell, 2001).
7   If we 
assume that employment turnover is a relative measure of restructuring, Poland did more 
                                                                                                                                                              
1993.  This will slightly understate the size of the privatized sector as this definition omits those 
who worked for a state firm and moved to a different privatized firm.  Given the slow rate of 
privatization and the fact that privatized firms created very few gross new jobs, the amount of 
understatement will be quite small. 
7 Jurajda and Terrell’s percentages are proportions of those employed, rather than a fraction of the 
total workforce.  Consequently, their estimates of job turnover if adjusted to match our 
denominator would be smaller, particularly in Estonia where unemployment was higher. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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restructuring than did the Czech Republic or Estonia, with the largest differences being the larger 
amount of job destruction in Polish state firms.     
Employment Transitions 
The internal entries in Tables 1 - 3, showing the mobility among job categories during the 
transition, are more substantively important than the marginal distributions just described.  It is 
important to note that we use the term “job” to mean being employed by a given type of 
enterprise, not the position or responsibilities within the enterprise.  In our use, job mobility refers 
to changing the type of firm where one works, not to changing one’s responsibilities if she or he 
stays with the same firm type.
8  The rows show the probability of a person transiting from one 
type of job to another or out of or into the active workforce.  With one exception we will ignore 
the transitions into the non-work category as most of those changes are related to age and thus to 
people reaching the legal retirement age rather than to responses to economic factors.  As 
expected with the Polish transition, there is very little movement out of the private sector.  For 
workers in the private sector the probabilities of remaining in that sector are between 0.60 and 
0.65 for the two five year intervals about .55 for the ten year interval.  The probability of a private 
worker in 1988 becoming unemployed is 0.08 in 1993 and a 0.03 in 1998.  Otherwise the shifts 
out of private employment are negligible.   
For workers in state enterprises in 1988 the story is quite different.  The probabilities that 
these workers remain in their original sector vary from .4 to .6 between 1988 and 1993 and fall to 
.2 to .4 between 1988 and 1998, with the odds of remaining in the state manufacturing sector 
being particularly low.  Between 1988 and 1993 ten to fifteen percent of the state workers move 
to the private sector while a sixth leave the workforce altogether and about ten percent became 
unemployed.   These proportions shifted dramatically for the full 1988 to 1998 period.  About a 
sixth of the state sector workers in 1988 moved to the de novo private sector by 1998, another 
eight percent are in privatized firms, about six percent are unemployed and thirty percent left the 
workforce.   
One mobility pattern is particularly important, and revealing about the path from a state 
controlled to a private economy.  Between 1988 and 1993, state workers had about a ten percent 
chance of becoming unemployed and a sixteen percent chance of leaving the workforce.  
Between 1993 and 1998, about a quarter of the unemployed and eight percent of the non-workers 
found jobs in the private sector.  These transition probabilities suggest that it may have been 
common for state workers to become unemployed or to drop out of the workforce before finding 
a private sector job.  Of the 179 state workers who moved from their state jobs to jobs in the de 
novo private sector between 1988 and 1998 fifty-one, or nearly thirty percent, were unemployed 
or out of the workforce in 1993.  Responses to one of the questions asked in 1993 indicate an 
even higher incidence of unemployment spells among those moving to the private sector.  
Respondents were asked how many months of unemployment they had experienced between 
1988 and 1993.  Of the 163 respondents moving from the state to the private sector in that period, 
forty-three, or over a quarter, report a spell of unemployment.
9  Of the 179 making the transition 
                                                      
8 This definition will understate job creation and destruction as someone can be employed by a 
firm of a given type, say a private firm, at time t0 and employed by a different firm of the same 
type at t1 and our methodology would not identify this as an employment change.  This would 
miss both the possible destruction and creation of a job in the private sector.  Obviously someone 
changing the position, or job, within the same enterprise will not be identified as a job mover by 
this methodology. 
9 The average reported amount of unemployment was ten months.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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between 1988 and 1998 nearly forty percent (67) report some period of unemployment or being 
out of the workforce.        
This evidence suggests that transitions should be modeled as a second order Markov process, 
rather than a first order process, in order to capture fully the features of job mobility.  This 
observation of spells of unemployment in the Polish experience differs from what Jurajda and 
Terrell observed in the Czech Republic, where they found a large amount of mobility directly 
from the state to the private sector, (Jurajda and Terrell, 2001).  These differences can be related 
to the different speeds of transition in each country, with Poland having a much higher rate of job 
destruction in the state sector early in the transition. 
A second part of the job mobility story is that nearly fifteen percent of the non-workers in 
1988 report moving into a private sector job by 1998, suggesting that an important proportion of 
the new private sector workforce is composed of people who entered the workforce during the 
transition.  (About a sixth of the private sector workforce in 1998 are people who in 1988 said 
they were not in the workforce.)  This suggests there is considerable competition between new 
entrants and former state sector workers for the jobs being created in the private sector.   
Individual Characteristics and Employment Mobility 
The next analysis examines the individual factors associated with these transition 
probabilities.  The simple question is, “How does the probability of a person moving from one 
sector to another, given an initial sector, vary with factors such as their wages, their age, 
education, local economic conditions, etc.?”  These associations offer insight into which types of 
respondents are able to make the transition, how sensitive the transition is to economic 
differences in the different sectors, and where there is friction in the labor market.   
Let Pij be the probability of transiting from sector j to sector i during one of the time periods.   
The subscripts i and j vary across our employment categories used in Tables 1 – 3, with some 
aggregation.  We combine the two state sector categories and those in privatized firms to create a 
single category corresponding to the old sector.
10  Our analysis estimates separate probit models 
for three different outcomes for each time interval, 1998-93, 1993-98, and 1988-98.
11  One model 
is the probability of shifting into the de novo private sector given that the respondent was not 
privately employed initially..  The second is the probability of becoming unemployed, given that 
the person is in the labor force initially.  For the 1993-98 period we condition this model on the 
person not being unemployed in 1993.  The last model is the probability of leaving the workforce 
given that the respondent was in the workforce at the beginning of the period.  These individual 
                                                      
10  It makes conceptual sense to include those in privatized firms in 1993 and 1998 with the state 
sector as these individuals did not change employment by our definition.  They simply had the 
ownership of their enterprise change.  Furthermore, all the evidence in this and other papers 
concludes that it is the creation of the de novo sector that is most important to the transition, so 
we want to model the probability of individuals shifting into that sector.  This is also consistent 
with the coding used by Jurajda and Terrell who defined an “old” sector and a de novo sector. 
11 A complete model would take the form of a multinomial logit model predicting the probability 
of respondents being in one of the five employment categories, given their employment in 1988 
or 1993.  Unfortunately, this estimation is not statistically feasible.  As seen in Tables 1 – 3 there 
are a lot of cells with very few entries.  Almost no one leaves the private sector, except to leave 
the workforce, and no one shifts into the state sector.  Efforts to estimate full multinomial logit 
models for each employment category produced unstable and in places nonsense results.   
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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models capture the key employment transitions during this period – moving into the de novo 
private sector, being unemployed, and leaving the workforce. 
One set of variables of interest is respondents’ employment sector at the beginning of the 
period as this will indicate the likely transition rates.  A second set of variables measures their 
wage, their job tenure and organizational level if they work in an enterprise.  Two variables assess 
local economic conditions and estimate the association between individual job mobility and the 
unemployment rate and the rate of de novo job creation in the resondent’s voivodship (province).  
Lastly, we include variables measuring persons’ age, gender and education, represented by their 
years of schooling.   
Mobility to the Private Sector 
Table 4 shows the estimated probit models for the probability of a person moving into the 
private sector during each time interval, given that they were not privately employed at the 
beginning.  In each interval people who were not employed, either because they were out of the 
workforce or unemployed (for 1993), had a significant probability of taking a job in the private 
sector.  For an otherwise average respondent, these probabilities range from 0.05 for a not 
working person in 1988 to 0.2 for the unemployed in 1993-98.  These results reinforce the earlier 
observation that an important component of the private sector workforce by 1998 came from 
those outside the workforce or who went through a period of unemployment.  State workers in the 
manufacturing sector were more likely than workers in other sectors to move to the private sector, 
with the exception of farmers between 1993 and 1998.      
     (Table  4  About  Here.) 
Current employment conditions are only weakly related to job mobility to the private sector.  
Initial wages are negatively associated with mobility between 1998 and 1993 as expected, though 
the relationship is small and not statistically significant.  Between 1993 and 1998 this association 
is very weakly positive, but statistically not different from zero.  Job tenure in the state sector is 
negatively related to mobility in the 1988 to 1993 and 1993 and 1998 time periods.  People with 
supervisory positions were more likely to move to the private sector between 1988 and 1993 but 
very slightly less likely to do so between 1988 and 1993, yielding an overall positive probability 
for the whole 1988 to 1998 period.  The results suggest that economic push forces, such as low 
wages, do not appear to be a strong factor in mobility to the private sector.  It is more likely that 
the primary factor is a big push, in the form of a job closure, which is not measured in these data.  
It may well be the case, however, that the relationship between mobility and tenure in the state 
sector reflects a lower likelihood of losing, or being threatened with loss of, ones job. 
Local economic conditions, particularly the rate of de novo job creation in the region, are 
strongly associated with movement to the private sector.  A one standard deviation difference in 
the proportion of the regional workforce employed in de novo jobs in 1997 is associated with a 
.04 difference in the probability of a person in that region moving to the private sector between 
1988 and 1998.  The local unemployment rate is positively associated with mobility to the private 
sector for all three intervals though the estimated coefficients are all smaller than their standard 
errors. Our best guess is that local unemployment, as distinguished from individual 
unemployment, is not a factor in movement to the private sector.  What is important is the 
availability of new jobs.  
There is an obvious simultaneity problem in this analysis, particularly as it relates to the 
relationship between regional de novo job creation and movement to the private sector.  Regions 
where individuals are more likely to move to the private sector will be regions that have larger de 
novo economies, rather than de novo job creation being a spur to mobility.  To partially control William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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for this possibility we re-ran the 1993 to 1998 estimation using the size of the de novo sector in 
1993 and the 1993 unemployment rate as the explanatory variables.
12  The results are very 
consistent with the previous interpretation.  The probability of a person moving to the private 
sector between 1993 and 1998 was significantly higher in regions with high rates of de novo job 
creation between 1989 and 1993.   
Lastly, in terms of personal characteristics there are few surprises, except possibly that 
education is not associated with mobility between 1988 and 1993, though it is for the 1993 to 
1998 and thus for the 1988 to 1998 periods.  By 1998 a four year difference in years of schooling 
is associated with about a 0.04 higher probability of moving to the private sector.    Men are more 
likely than women to move to the private sector and mobility decreases with age.  Neither result 
is a surprise.  One possible surprise is that for the 1988 to 1998 people aged forty-five to fifty in 
1988 are less likely to move than people younger or older.  As this disparity with older 
respondents is not evident for either sub-interval it may be a spurious result.  It is an intriguing 
result nonetheless, as this is the age group with no experience outside the socialist economy.  
Older individuals would have some memory about Poland’s previous market economy.   
Movements to Unemployment  
Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients in the probit model for the probability of being 
unemployed in 1993 or 1998 given that the person was in the workforce in 1988 or 1993.  Other 
than the negative relationship between being a farmer and becoming unemployed between 1988 
and 1993 there is very little consistent relationship between a person’s employment sector and 
becoming unemployed.   This is surprising, given the expectation that declines in the state sector 
would lead to unemployment.  There is a small negative relationship between job tenure and 
becoming unemployed, which is not surprising. There is also no relationship between being a 
supervisor and becoming unemployed.   
There is a positive relationship between local unemployment rates and the likelihood of being 
unemployed between 1988 and 1993 but otherwise there is no association between local 
economic conditions and individual unemployment.  We expect a negative relationship between 
de novo job creation and unemployment, particularly as this variable is positively associated with 
movements to the private sector, but there is no supporting evidence.  
The only consistent relationships with the probability of becoming unemployed are with 
education and the age categories.  Higher levels of education are strongly associated with 
decreases in the likelihood of becoming unemployed for all three intervals.  The probability of 
becoming unemployed decreases with age and is particularly low among the upper age categories.  
(We show in the next section that these age groups are more likely to just leave the workforce 
rather than to become unemployed.)  Males are slightly less likely to become unemployed than 
females, though the differences are not large or statistically significant. 
Movements out of the Workforce 
The last workforce change is the movement out of the workforce.  The estimated probit 
model is shown in Table 6.  As suggested previously, most of this movement is related to 
retirement.  This association is very evident in the distribution of coefficients among the different 
age categories.  Between 1988 and 1993 the likelihood of leaving the workforce increases 
significantly at age 45 and becomes quite large for those over 55.  The shift in the relationship 
                                                      
12 This would be analogous to using the lagged values of de novo job creation and unemployment 
as instruments for the 1998 values for these variables, though there is the potential problem that 
exists with all instrumental variable estimation using lagged values in that the instrument may not 
be independent of the outcome variable. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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with age between 1993 and 1998 where forty to forty five year olds significantly increase their 
likelihood of leaving the workforce and where the probability of the older cohorts leaving 
increases substantially is what one would expect as everyone is five years older in 1998 than they 
were in 1993.  An average respondent who is over 50 in 1988 has a probability of 0.75 of retiring 
by 1998 and the probability is about .55 for someone between fifty and fifty-five.  As we mention 
above, these older respondents are more likely to leave the workforce than to become 
unemployed or to move to the private sector.   
The only anomaly in the relationship between exiting the labor force and age is between 1988 
and 1993 when respondents under thirty are more likely to exit than are respondents between 
thirty and forty.  This outcome is another example of the two-step process of movement into the 
private sector.  Nearly half of the under thirty respondents who left the workforce between 1988 
and 1993 are employed in the private sector in 1998.  The probability of an under thirty 
respondent who left the workforce between 1988 and 1993 moving to the private sector is higher 
than the probability for a comparable person over thirty though we cannot say this difference is 
statistically significant because of the small sample size.  Males and better educated respondents 
are much less likely to leave the workforce. 
There are several associations between employment conditions and the probability of leaving 
the workforce.  Private sector workers, except the self-employed, are more likely to leave the 
workforce than workers in the state sector. Employees in the state manufacturing sector are 
slightly more likely than workers in the other state sectors to leave the workforce though these 
relationships are not strong.  Farmers and the self-employed in 1988 are less likely to leave the 
workforce than respondents working for formal organizations but there is no difference between 
1993 and 1998.  Between 1993 and 1998 people residing in regions with a high level of de novo 
job creation are less likely to leave the workforce.  This relationship holds for the whole period as 
well even though there is no difference for the 1988 to 1993 period.  Local unemployment rates 
are not associated with exits from the workforce.   
Wage Changes 
The last analysis is of the changes in wages.  The analysis addresses two questions.  One is 
simply the expected wage difference associated with employment in and moves between sectors.  
For example, do people moving from the state sector to the private sector experience an increase 
or a decrease in wages.  The second question is whether individual attributes, such as schooling, 
job tenure and experience are valued differently in a market economy, which will produce wage 
changes related to these attributes.   
There are several different propositions about the expected wage difference between the state 
and private sectors.  The de novo private firms are more efficient and productive than the state 
firms, which in the long run means that wages in the private sector should be higher as labor will 
receive its marginal product in each set of firms.  This, of course, assumes that the state firms face 
a hard budget constraint and their wages are not subsidized.  The reality is that state firms do not 
face perfectly hard budget constraints and governments, particularly those elected with support 
from workers in the state sector, find ways to maintain wage and employment subsidies. The 
softer the budget constraints, the higher the state sector wages.   
Private sector employment is divided into four separate categories as the wage changes in 
each are likely to be different and to follow different patterns over time.  The main distinction is 
between those who report being self-employed and those working for others in the private sector.  
For 1993 and 1998 the self-employed are further divided by whether they employ one to three 
persons (including themselves) or more than three workers.  Both groups can be defined as 
entrepreneurs, with the second group clearly being the more successful and thus likely to be 
earning a higher wage.  The fourth group is workers in privatized firms. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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Employment in the state manufacturing sector is taken as the base case in all of the analyses.  
Other categorical variables measure whether the respondent is employed in the non-
manufacturing state sector, is privately but not self-employed,  is self-employed with this latter 
category subdivided by small or large firms for 1993 and 1998, or works in a privatized firm.  We 
also test two interaction variables to indicate whether a person moving from one of the state 
sectors to the private sector or to being self-employed gets a larger than expected wage increase, 
or decrease.  The expression for these employment effects is,
13 
. * *       Pvt SOE B Self SOE B NotWork B NotWork B
Pvtzd B Pvtzd B Sto B Sto B Pvt B Pvt B Self B Self B B
13 12 11 0 10
1 8 0 7 7 6 0 5 1 4 0 3 1 2 0 1 0
+ + + +
+ + + + + + + +
 
The expressions SOE*Self and SOE*Pvt are the two interaction terms indicating the person 
moved from the state to one of the private sectors.  Those not working for a wage either at the 
beginning or the end of one period are included in the analysis so as not to lose those cases for the 
whole period.  This both preserves our sample size and reduces the opportunity for selection bias 
because those not earning a wage at some point are not a random sample of respondents. The only 
cases excluded were respondents, such as farmers, who did not receive wages in any of the three 
periods.   
The coefficients on the main variables taken as a pair indicate the expected wage change for 
that combination of employments.  The coefficient B0 indicates the expected wage change for 
someone employed in the state manufacturing sector for the whole period.  For someone who was 
employed in the private sector the whole period the expected wage change is (B0 + B3 + B4).  
Taking the interaction term into account, the expected wage change for someone moving from the 
state manufacturing to the private sector is, (B0 + B4 + B13).    The primary interest is the 
differences between state sector and private sector wage changes and how one’s wages are 
expected to change by moving from one sector to the other. 
A important force affecting private sector wages will be the rate of job creation in new firms 
and the level of unemployment.  The higher the rate of de novo job creation the higher the 
demand for labor in the private sector and the higher the expected increase in wages.  Conversely 
for the local unemployment rate.  The larger this pool of potential workers, the less upward 
pressure on wages.   
Firms competing in the private market are likely to value different skills and attributes than 
firms selling in planned markets.  The most conventional proposition is that human capital, as 
evidenced by years of schooling, will be more highly valued in the market than under the fixed 
wages in the planned system.  Other factors, such as work experience under the old system, 
tenure in a specific job, and age are likely to become less valued.  (See Diewald and Mach, 1999.)   
These panel data provide an excellent way to test these propositions as we have wage data for 
each point in time and can compare changes in wages with various individual and local factors.  
Our analytical strategy is to relate the difference in the log of per hour wages at time t and the log 
of wages at time t-1, [ log(Wt) - log(Wt-1)],  to a set of explanatory variables for people 
continuously in the workforce.
14   The explanatory variables include individual characteristics 
                                                      
13 To keep this expression simple we do not denote the separate self-employed small and self-
employed large sectors though they are treated separately in the analysis. 
14 The log of the “wage” for someone without income is arbitrarily set to log(0.05), which is well 
below the lowest earned wage.  The dummy variable for whether the person was working at the 
beginning of the end of the period adjusts for this arbitrariness without affecting the other 
coefficients. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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such as gender, education and age; assessments of employment history, such as total work 
experience and supervisory position; the two regional economic performance variables; and the 
employment sector dummy variables shown above.  Estimation is done for the wage level in 1988 
and for all three intervals.
15  The estimated coefficients and standard errors are shown in Table 7.  
The interaction terms were small and statistically insignificant and are omitted from Table 7 and 
the discussion.
16   
     (Table  7  About  Here.) 
The first column in Table 7 estimates the log of the level of wages in 1988.  Males earn 
twenty-three percent more than females, each additional year of schooling is associated with a six 
percent higher wage, and wages do not increase age, controlling for job tenure and work 
experience.  Wages increase about six tenths of a percent for each year of additional experience 
and about four tenths of a percent for each additional year in the current job.  Supervisors earn 
about ten percent more than non-supervisors.  Self-employed individuals earn the most and 
workers in non-manufacturing state enterprises the least, with private workers and state 
employees in manufacturing earning about the same.  The important question is how these 
relationships change during the transition between 1988 and 1998. 
The returns to education increased over both five year intervals, but particularly between 
1993 and 1998.  An additional year of schooling is associated with a four percent higher wage 
increase between 1988 and 1998.  The wage gap between males and females increased some, but 
the change is not statistically significant.  Between 1993 and 1998 and for the period as a whole, 
wage increases were smaller the older the respondent.  A ten year age difference is associated 
with about a four percent smaller wage increase for the 1988 to 1998 period.  Job tenure was not 
associated with any wage change, while increased total work experience is associated with 
smaller wage increases between 1988 and 1993 and for the period as a whole.  Keeping or 
moving to a supervisory position is associated with significant wage increases.  Respondents in 
regions with a high rate of de novo job creation had significantly higher wage increases, 
suggesting a higher demand for labor in areas where there was a successful new sector.
17  There 
was no association between wage increases and unemployment rates.   
The expected wage changes associated with changes in employment categories are 
summarized in Table 8.  The entries show the expected percentage wage increase for workers in 
or moving between given categories.  By far the biggest gainers are those entrepreneurs who own 
large firms by 1998.  They consistently gain more than any other employment pattern, regardless 
of where they started.  This is hardly a surprise, but reinforces the general belief that Poland 
created an entrepreneurially oriented economy during the transition.  The self-employed in small 
                                                      
15 Because of the highly inter-related nature of these variables and the implicit error terms we 
used a seemingly unrelated regression estimation across all four equations. 
16 The F-statistic for whether the coefficients on the interaction terms differed from zero would be 
exceeded by chance 63.4% of the time.  Only in the 1988-1993 equation is a coefficient larger 
than 0.04 and it has a t-statistic of only 1.11, which leads us to not reject the null hypothesis that 
the true value is zero.   
17 For the 1988 – 1993 and 1988 – 1998 periods the in the number of de novo jobs is simply the 
number of those jobs as a proportion of the workforce in 1993 and 1998 respectively, as there 
were virtually no de novo jobs in 1988. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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enterprises fared more poorly, particularly between 1988 and 1993, though they started with a 
higher wage than others.
18    
        (Insert Table 8 About Here.) 
A second notable wage difference is that workers staying in or moving to the de novo private 
sector had smaller wage increases than workers in any other category.  Their real wages 
decreased by nearly twenty-five percent between 1993 and 1988 workers in the state 
manufacturing sector had larger increases than anyone except for the self-employed.   A previous 
paper examined state sector payroll increases and concluded that during the 1993-1997 period 
state sector wages increased faster and were less related to productivity than private sector wages 
(Jackson, Klich and Poznańska, 1999 and 2001).  This coincided with the period when the 
government was controlled by a coalition of post-Communist parties whose campaign included a 
promise to end the high tax on state sector wage increases enacted by the previous reform 
government.  The consequence of this wage tax is seen by comparing the wage increases between 
1988 and 1993 with the gains over the next five years.  Between 1988 and 1993 employees in the 
private sector or those moving to the private sector had larger wage increases than workers 
staying in the state manufacturing sector.  Just the opposite occurred between 1993 and 1998.  For 
the full ten year period state manufacturing workers and successful entrepreneurs had larger wage 
increases than private sector workers or those moving to the private sector.    
One important observation follows from these results when combined with the results in 
Table 4 showing the probability of moving to the private sector.  In neither case is there evidence 
that wage differences or the promise of wage differences induces much movement from the state 
to the private sector.  Table 4 shows that low wages in the previous job were unrelated to the 
likelihood of moving.  Tables 7 and 8 indicate that with the possible exception of 1988 to 1993 
when wages in the state sector were controlled, workers moving to the private sector did not 
obtain higher wages than workers staying in the state sector, particularly in manufacturing.  A 
much more likely explanation for the high level of employment movement from the state to the 
private sector is the destruction of jobs in the state sector, a conclusion supported by the number 
of workers who report being unemployed or out of the workforce in 1993 and who then are 
employed in the private sector in 1998. 
Conclusions 
These panel data present a detailed view of the transition from a state dominated to a market 
economy.  Individual transitions from the state sector to the private sector are the dominant job 
change, other than retirements from the labor force.  In the Polish case, a significant proportion of 
this movement over the 1988 to 1998 period involves a period of unemployment or exit from the 
labor force before obtaining a private sector job.  Interestingly, there is the suggestion that this 
was particularly evident among those under thirty at the time the transition began.  These results 
contrast with evidence from the Czech Republic for the 1991-1996 period, which is very likely 
due to the difference in the rate at which the state enterprises were closed or restructured during 
the periods studied.  
A second feature of the Polish transition is considerable job competition between workers 
leaving the state sector and those who were out of the labor force at the beginning of the 
transition.  This competition further contributes to the real unemployment rate as it will leave 
some former state workers without jobs.  The interesting question to pursue is whether the 
                                                      
18 Some of this difference between the self-employed in 1988 and other employment categories 
may be a consequence of not being able to distinguish between the self-employed with large and 
those with small firms.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
  13
difficulties faced by the former state workers relate to a lack of skills or proper attitudes relative 
to the new entrants for coping with the demands of the new private sector. 
The likelihood of moving to the private sector was higher for the better educated and for 
residents of regions with a robust de novo economy, suggesting that the supply of jobs in the 
private sector combined with higher levels of human capital lead to faster and smoother 
transitions.  There is also evidence of a push factor as employees in the state manufacturing 
sector, the sector with the largest aggregate employment declines, were more likely to move to 
the private sector than were workers in other state enterprises or farmers.  Interestingly wages 
differences between the state sector and the de novo sector appear to have little association with 
mobility, suggesting that movement is not strongly related to the opportunity to find a higher 
paying job.   
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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Appendix A 
Polish Social Structure and Social Mobility Panel Study  
The Polish Academy of Sciences began a longitudinal study of workers and occupations in 
1988.  Selected respondents were re-interviewed in 1993 and again in 1998, with supplemental 
samples added in each wave to keep the sample current and to provide an over sample of 
entrepreneurs and college graduates.  Table A1 shows the sample sizes for each wave of the panel 
study and the supplements.   
 
Table A1:  Polish Social Structure and Social Mobility Panel 
 1988  1993  1998 
N – Original Sample  5854  2102  1775 
N – Oversample from Original (Entrepreneur + College)      166  127 
The information in this paper is obtained from combining questions from these surveys.  The 
most important feature is the fact that 2268 of the 1993 interviews and 1775 of the 1998 
interviews were with respondents who had been interviewed in 1988, providing the longitudinal 
information that spans the beginning of the transformation in 1989. 
The 1988, the 1993, and the 1998 study were carried out under the auspices of the Institute of 
Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The list of researchers involved in 
at least one wave includes: Ireneusz Białecki, Henryk Domański, Anna, Firkowska, Krystyna 
Janicka, Bogdan W. Mach, Joanna Sikorska, Kazimierz M. Słomczyński, Zbyszek Sawiński, 
Wojciech Zaborowski, and Krzysztof Zagórski.   
In the 1988 study, the basic sample consisted of 6,000 men and women aged 21-65 drawn 
from the central register of Polish citizens (PESEL). If a respondent from this sample was 
unavailable for an interview, then a substitute from the auxiliary sample (N=3,167) was used. The 
auxiliary sample was a set of small random samples available for all combinations of the type of 
residence and geographical location. A special algorithm was designed how to find a replacement 
for any person in the basic sample who either could not be reached or declined to cooperate with 
an interviewer. A replacement was defined as a person matching the (unavailable) respondent 
from the basic sample on the combination of type of residence, geographical location, gender, age 
, and education. For the basic sample the response rate was 71% (4373/6000). In addition, 1,505 
cases were obtained from the auxiliary sample resulting in a total of 5,878 cases. Since some 
cases were discarded due to missing data, the final number of cases in the file of the 1988 study is 
5,854. 
In 1993, 2,500 cases were randomly selected from the 5,854 cases of the 1988 study. The 
response rate for the 1993 study was 84%, yielding 2,102 cases. In addition, in 1993 interviews 
were made with all those who in 1988 were either self-employed (outside agriculture) or had a 
university degree, but were not among 2,500 persons randomly selected for an interview. This 
overrepresentation supplement yielded 166 cases. 
In 1998 an effort was made to re-interview all 1993 respondents. 1775 out of the target of 
2268 (2102 + 166) cases were re-interviewed yielding the response rate of 78%.   
In the analysis reported in this paper we removed from our  working file 3 1993 respondents 
because the 1993 data strongly suggested they might not be the targeted 1988 persons and 16 
1998 respondents because the 1998 data strongly suggested they might not be the targeted 1993 
persons.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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Table 1:  Employment Transitions, 1988-1993 
 1993 
 Not  Pvt.  Private State  State  Privtzd Unemp  1988  N 
1988 Work  Farm    Mfg  Other     Share   
Not Work  0.600  0.046 0.100 0.031 0.105 0.000 0.118 0.203  458 
Pvt-Farm 0.243  0.688  0.040 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.017 0.134  301 
Private 0.107  0.066  0.645  0.041 0.058 0.000  0.083 0.054  121 
State                  
  Mfg  0.177  0.060  0.143  0.415  0.059 0.047 0.099 0.295  665 
  Other  0.157  0.031  0.096  0.013  0.571  0.035 0.096 0.314 707 
Privatized -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -      0 
Unemp   -  -  -  -  -  -  -   -         0 
‘93 Share  0.262  0.132  0.133  0.136  0.222  0.025  0.090  1.000   
N 590  298  299  306  500    56  203    2252 
Net Diff  132     -3  178   -359   -207    56  203     
Gross Job Creation and Job Destruction, # of Jobs 
Creation  315    91  221    30   96    56  203     1012 
Destruction   -183     -94  -43   -389   -303     -  -    -1012 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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Table 2:  Employment Transitions, 1993-1998 
  1998 
 Not  Pvt.  Private State  State  Privtzd Unemp  1993  N 
1993 Work  Farm    Mfg  Other     Share   
Not Work  0.837  0.014 0.082 0.016 0.026 0.000 0.026 0.244  429 
Pvt-Farm 0.394  0.452  0.097 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.042 0.147  259 
Private 0.236  0.027  0.618  0.027 0.059 0.000  0.032 0.125  220 
State           
  Mfg  0.194  0.019  0.101  0.457  0.027 0.147 0.054 0.147  258 
  Other  0.174  0.021  0.070  0.005  0.647  0.060 0.023 0.219  385 
Privatized 0.178  0.000  0.044  0.044  0.067  0.578  0.089  0.026    45 
Unemp   0.375  0.019  0.256  0.031  0.075  0.000  0.244  0.091   160 
’98 Share  0.397  0.083  0.166  0.080  0.170  0.050  0.054  1.000   
N  698  145  292  140  299    87   95    1756 
Net Diff  269  -114   72   -118    -86    42   -65     
Gross Job Creation and Job Destruction, # of Jobs 
Creation  339    28  156    22   50    61   56      712 
Destruction    -70   -142   -84   -140   -136   -19  -121     -712 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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Table 3:  Employment Transitions, 1988-1998 
  1998 
 Not  Pvt.  Private State  State  Privtzd Unemp  1988  N 
1988 Work  Farm    Mfg  Other     Share   
Not Work  0.644  0.021 0.139 0.018 0.097 0.012 0.069 0.188  331 
Pvt-Farm 0.522  0.369  0.078 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.016 0.145  255 
Private 0.276  0.034  0.540  0.034 0.069 0.000  0.046 0.050    87 
State           
  Mfg  0.306  0.039  0.193  0.231  0.060 0.099 0.071 0.304  533 
  Other  0.300  0.036  0.138  0.011  0.413  0.055 0.047 0.313  550 
Privatized  -  -  -  -  -  -  -   -         0 
Unemp   -  -  -  -  -  -  -   -         0 
‘98  Share  0.397 0.083 0.166 0.080 0.170 0.050 0.054 1.000   
N  698  145  292  140  299   87   95    1756 
Net Diff  367   -110  205   -393   -251    87   95     
Gross Job Creation and Job Destruction, # of Jobs 
Creation  485    51  245    17  72    87   95     1052 
Destruction   -118    -161  -40   -410   -323   -  -    -1052 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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Table 4: Probability of Moving to the Private Sector 
 1988-1993  1993-1998  1988-1998 
 Coeff  St. Err  Coeff  St. Err  Coeff  St. Err 
Tenure0 -0.027  0.006  -0.017  0.008  -0.016  0.006 
Supervise0 0.217  0.113  -0.059  0.166   0.182  0.116 
Wage0 -0.025  0.021   0.016  0.019  -0.009  0.020 
Farm0 -0.518  0.182   0.690  0.177  -0.164  0.176 
Soemfg0 0.206  0.097   0.273  0.156  0.240  0.102 
Unemp0     0.853  0.178     
Not Work0 0.294  0.136  0.689  0.190  0.377  0.143 
% New Jobs  5.889  1.504  2.423  0.764  2.369  0.656 
% Unemp  0.188  0.768  0.868  1.390  0.918  1.176 
Educ 0.019  0.015  0.048  0.019  0.042  0.016 
Male   0.377  0.086  0.276  0.103  0.271  0.089 
Age 30-35  -0.021  0.118  -0.161  0.143  -0.181  0.120 
Age 35-40  -0.012  0.126  -0.197  0.150  -0.201  0.128 
Age 40-45  -0.156  0.145  -0.320  0.164  -0.250  0.143 
Age 45-50  -0.280  0.174  -0.902  0.226  -0.983  0.214 
Age 50-55/>50  -0.379  0.184  -1.292  0.187  -0.961  0.161 
Age > 55  -0.597  0.166         
Constant -1.711  0.285  -2.323  0.372  -1.751  0.213 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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Table 5: Probability of Becoming Unemployed 
 1988-1993  1993-1998  1988-1998 
 Coeff  St. Err  Coeff  St. Err  Coeff  St. Err 
Tenure0 -0.012  0.007  -0.027  0.010  -0.006  0.011 
Supervise0 -0.019  0.132  -0.056  0.220  0.327  0.189 
Private0 0.132  0.285  -0.483  0.280  0.502  0.384 
Self Emp0 -0.329  0.237  0.155  0.269  -0.637  0.471 
Farm0 -1.182  0.218  0.144  0.217  -0.709  0.257 
Soemfg0 -0.042  0.101  0.309  0.200  0.154  0.144 
% New Jobs  2.489  1.780  -1.504  1.426  -0.226  1.101 
% Unemp  1.761  0.839  1.238  2.106  2.175  1.712 
Educ -0.083  0.019  -0.092  0.034  -0.151  0.033 
Male   -0.067  0.094  -0.156  0.151  -0.234  0.131 
Age 30-35  -0.179  0.138   0.038  0.204  -0.349  0.179 
Age 35-40  -0.362  0.153   -0.113  0.227  -0.334  0.190 
Age 40-45  -0.186  0.158   0.075  0.233  -0.446  0.215 
Age 45-50  -0.193  0.185  -0.164  0.305  -0.846  0.292 
Age 50-55/>50  -0.199  0.193  -0.768  0.419  -1.486  0.328 
Age > 55  -0.442  0.201         
Constant -0.421  0.323  -0.337  0.576  0.317  0.484 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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Table 6: Probability of Leaving the Workforce 
 1988-1993  1993-1998  1988-1998 
 Coeff  St. Err  Coeff  St. Err  Coeff  St. Err 
Private0 0.594  0.275  0.495  0.157   0.491  0.332 
Self Emp0 -0.687  0.258  -0.060  0.188  -0.253  0.205 
Farm0 -0.469  0.136  0.037  0.142  -0.175  0.138 
Soemfg0 0.150  0.097  0.210  0.134  0.146  0.102 
Unemp0     0.595  0.146     
% New Jobs  -1.572  1.645  -1.416  0.769  -2.030  0.726 
% Unemp  0.358  0.796  -0.200  1.340  -0.088  1.247 
Educ -0.055  0.015  -0.097  0.017  -0.107  0.016 
Male   -0.327  0.085  -0.388  0.091  -0.473  0.090 
Age 30-35  -0.515  0.169  0.102  0.157  0.129  0.161 
Age 35-40  -0.372  0.156  0.281  0.154  0.282  0.155 
Age 40-45  -0.195  0.159  0.761  0.151  0.835  0.151 
Age 45-50  0.403  0.152  1.587  0.168  1.636  0.163 
Age 50-55/>50  1.086  0.140  2.121  0.161  2.375  0.151 
Age > 55  1.549  0.136         
Constant -0.497  0.281  -0.127  0.330   0.280  0.302 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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Table 7: Wage Equations 
  1988  1988-1993 1993-1998 1988-1998 
 Coeff  St. Err Coeff  St. Err  Coeff  St. Err  Coeff  St. Err 
Male 0.211  0.023   0.023  0.035  0.006  0.041   0.026  0.037 
Education 0.054  0.004  0.004  0.002  0.035  0.006  0.039  0.006 
Age/10 0.009  0.025   0.002  0.011  -0.035  0.022  -0.041  0.022 
Job Tenure/10   0.037  0.014   0.002  0.008  0.007  0.010  0.010  0.013 
Yrs. Exper./10   0.062  0.024  -0.071  0.018  -0.008  0.010  -0.073  0.019 
Superviser0 0.107  0.031  -0.102  0.043   -0.210 0.043  -0.101  0.042 
Superviser1     0.210  0.042  0.400  0.104  0.399  0.104 
Self – Small0   0.258  0.062  -0.307  0.091  -0.042  0.073  -0.304  0.090 
Self – Small1       0.037  0.072   0.098  0.072   0.100  0.071 
Self – Large0                              -0.512  0.139                
Self - Large1     0.517  0.137  0.829  0.124  0.829  0.123 
Private0 0.076  0.086  -0.055  0.117   0.086  0.055  -0.055  0.117 
Private1      -0.086  0.055  -0.212  0.060  -0.217  0.059 
Privatized0         -0.152  0.082     
Privatized1     0.143  0.080  0.060  0.068  0.058  0.067 
State - Other0 -0.107  0.026   0.173  0.039   0.048  0.045   0.174  0.039 
State – Other1     -0.047  0.045  -0.182  0.057  -0.181  0.056 
Not Work0 -3.510  0.076  4.221  0.047  4.290  0.046  4.218  0.047 
Not Work1     -4.221  0.047  -4.290  0.046  -4.218  0.047 
∆ % New Jobs      0.696  0.256  1.197  0.278  1.024  0.208 
∆ % Unemp      -0.022  0.130   -0.018 0.316   0.053  0.198 
Constant 0.505  0.073  -0.012  0.035  0.008  0.036  -0.006  0.041 
R
2 0.96    0.95    0.95    0.96   
N = 932                 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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Table 8:  Employment Change and Percent Wage Change 
From  To  1988 - 93  1993 - 98  1988 - 98 
Employment  Stable     
State - Mfg  State – Mfg   0.0  0.0   0.0 
State - Other  State – Other  13.4  -12.5  -0.7 
Privatized Privatized   -8.8  
Private  Private  -13.2 -11.8 -23.8 
Self - Small  Self – Small  -23.7  5.8  -18.5 
Self - Large  Self - Large    37.3   
Employment  Change     
State – Mfg  Self - Large  67.7  129.1  129.1 
State – Other  Self – Large  99.4  140.4  172.6 
Private  Self - Large  58.7  149.7  116.8 
Self - Small  Self - Large  23.4  119.7  69.1 
State – Mfg  Self - Small  3.8  10.3  10.5 
State – Other  Self – Small  23.4  15.7  31.5 
Private  Self – Small  -1.8  20.2  4.6 
Self – Large  Self - Small    -33.9   
State – Mfg  Private  -8.2  -19.1  -29.5 
State – Other  Private  9.1  -15.1  -4.2 
Self - Small  Private  -32.5  -22.4  -40.6 
Self - Large  Private  -8.2  -51.5  -19.5 
State – Mfg  Privatized  15.4  6.2  6.0 
State - Other  Privatized  37.2  11.4  26.1 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 502 
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